

Message Text

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ORIGIN ACDA-19

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INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03

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PM/DCA:VBAKER

EUR/RPM:AFLOYD

ACDA:THIRSCHFELD

C:VLEHOVICH

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TO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: NATO, PARM

SUBJECT: MBFR: BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WITH CANADIANS

REFS: A. NATO 2411 B. STATE 90116

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

SUMMARY: BILATERAL TALKS WITH CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN
WASHINGTON ON MAY 7 PRODUCED A USEFUL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS
ON CURRENT MBFR QUESTIONS. THE CANADIANS RAISED QUESTIONS

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PARTICULARLY ABOUT US FORMULATION PRESENTED TO NAC (REFTEL

A) THAT ALL NON-US FORCES WOULD REDUCE IN PHASE II. CANADIAN TEAM POINTED OUT THAT FORMULA IMPLIED CANADIAN REDUCTIONS, AN ISSUE NOT YET RESOLVED IN OTTAWA. WE ALSO REVIEWED SOVIET ATTITUDES ON MBFR, AND PROVIDED RUN-DOWN ON US VIEWS REGARDING NEXT STEPS ON PHASING. END SUMMARY.

1. IN RESPONSE TO A CANADIAN REQUEST FOR CONSULTATIONS ON THE STATUS AND PROSPECTS FOR MBFR TALKS, INTERAGENCY MBFR COORDINATING COMMITTEE MET WITH CANADIAN TEAM MAY 7. THE CANADIAN DELEGATION WAS LED BY ROBERT CAMERON, DIRECTOR GENERAL, BUREAU OF DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL AFFAIRS, EXTAF. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY LOUIS A. DELVOIE, MBFR COORDINATOR IN EXTAF, AND COL. C. A. GREEN, DIRECTOR OF ARMS CONTROL POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, AND CANADIAN EMBASSY OFFICERS.

2. NON-US FORCES IN PHASE II. WE PRESENTED CURRENT USG THINKING ON THE NEXT MBFR NEGOTIATING SESSION AS OUTLINED IN THE GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN REFTEL B. THE CANADIANS NOTED OUR USE OF THE PHRASE "ALL WEST EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS" AND CONTRASTED THIS WITH THE PRESENTATION IN THE NAC WHICH CITED "NON-US FORCES" (NATO 2411). THEY SAID THEY ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO THIS POINT BECAUSE CANADA DOES NOT EXPECT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FIRST PHASE CUTS AND AS FOR PHASE II, ACCORDING TO CAMERON, THE QUESTION HAS NOT YET BEEN DECIDED BY THE CANADIAN CABINET. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE NUMBER OF CANADIAN FORCES IN WESTERN EUROPE WAS ALREADY SMALL AND THAT ANY CUTS AS A RESULT OF PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS WOULD BE MINUSCULE. WE SAID WE BELIEVED PHRASE "ALL WEST EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS" WAS PREFERABLE, BUT OF COURSE WE ARE PREPARED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT CANADIAN VIEWS. AS AN ADDITIONAL POINT HE THOUGHT THAT A PHRASE INDICATING "WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE" WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO "REDUCE", SINCE PHRASE IMPLIED LESS OF AN OBLIGATION.

3. POSSIBLE HARDENING OF SOVIET POSITION. THE CANADIANS EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE SOVIETS MAY CONSIDER HARDENING THEIR POSITION FOLLOWING A CONCLUSION OF THE CSCE AND ASKED WHETHER SALT, GENERAL EAST-WEST ISSUES AND

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BILATERAL ISSUES SUCH AS MFN MIGHT NOT COMPLICATE THE VIENNA TALKS. WE RESPONDED THAT APPARENT SOVIET SERIOUSNESS OF PURPOSE SUGGESTED SOME INTEREST IN REACHING AN AGREEMENT IN MBFR, ALTHOUGH THEY DO NOT SEEM TO BE IN ANY HURRY AND WE NOTED THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO RECALL THAT MBFR COULD PLAY A CONTINUOUS ROLE IN SOVIET DETENTE POLICY, AFTER CONCLUSION OF CSCE. WE NOTED THAT SOVIETS HAVE A RECORD IN THE PAST OF LINKAGE OF CSCE AND MBFR, AND

MIGHT DELAY PROGRESS OF MBFR UNTIL STATUS OF STAGE III OF CSCE IS CLEAR, ALTHOUGH ONLY TIME WILL TELL. AS FOR SALT, WE FEEL THE SOVIETS HAVE KEPT SALT AND MBFR SEPARATE ALTHOUGH CONCEPTUALLY THERE COULD EXIST A POSSIBLE OVERLAP BETWEEN SOME ASPECTS OF THE MBFR NUCLEAR OPTION AND FBS.

4. ALLIED POSITION/NUCLEAR OPTION. THE CANADIANS ASKED ABOUT HOW AND WHEN THE NUCLEAR OPTION MIGHT BE USED IN VIENNA, AND ABOUT ANY NEED TO CHANGE THE ALLIED NEGOTIATING POSITION. WE SAID THAT THE US POSITION AS EXPRESSED BY AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD IN JULY 1973, REMAINED VALID ALTHOUGH WE SAW NO NEED TO INTRODUCE NUCLEAR ASPECT NOW AND THOUGHT THAT ALLIED POSITION WAS SOUND AND SHOULD BE PLAYED OUT FURTHER.

5. AIR MANPOWER. THE CANADIANS ASKED HOW ONE MIGHT MODIFY THE NATO PROPOSALS BY INCLUDING AIR MANPOWER AND HOW SUCH MODIFICATIONS MIGHT BE PRESENTED TO THE EAST. WE RESPONDED THAT WE CONSIDERED ANY FORMAL DISCUSSION OF THIS POINT TO BE PREMATURE ALTHOUGH, CONCEPTUALLY, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO INCLUDE AIR MANPOWER IN THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME.

6. PHASING. THE CANADIANS SEEMED CONCERNED THAT PHASE II TALKS MIGHT BE UNDULY DELAYED AND INQUIRED ABOUT US RATIONALE FOR OUR PROPOSAL TO START PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS NOT LATER THAN 18 MONTHS AFTER SIGNING OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT. WE REPLIED THAT THE 18 MONTH FIGURE WAS BASED ON NATO ESTIMATE OF THE MAXIMUM RPT MAXIMUM TIME IT MIGH TAKE THE SOVIETS TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES. BUT THE FORMULATION "PREFERABLY AS SOON AFTER PHASE I SIGNATURE AS IS PRACTICABLE" WAS INSERTED TO ALLOW FOR AN EARLIER PHASE II

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NEGOTIATION, IF POLITICALLY DESIRABLE. THE CANADIAN VIEW, AS EXPRESSED BY MR. DELVOIE, WAS THAT THE PRECISE PERIOD SHOULD BE THE SUBJECT OF A POLITICAL DECISION AND SHOULD NOT BE PREJUDICED BY TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS. WE NOTED IN CLOSING THAT THE US POSITION ON WITHDRAWAL FROM A PHASE I AGREEMENT IS ALSO FLEXIBLE, I.E., FIVE YEARS OR UNLESS A PHASE II AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED. RUSH

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